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Abstract
In the spotlight for some time now, the potential of national parliaments to legitimise EU politics has become even more
salient given the growing politicisation and public contestation of EU issues. Their ability to realise this potential depends,
however, vitally on citizens being actually aware of parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. Academic as well as political
attention has thereforemore recently turned to the communication function of parliaments, and here themedia play a cru-
cial role. Important is not only whether EU parliamentary affairs are covered in the media, but alsowhowithin parliament
gets the opportunity to raise European issues in the media. In the context of this thematic issue, the question of media
visibility is of particular interest with regard to Eurosceptic parliamentary party groups and their members. Do Eurosceptics
in parliament get to dominate parliamentary EU news in the media and thus to take ownership of EU issues—or do the
media freeze parliamentary Eurosceptics out of the coverage? Both would seriously undermine the legitimising potential
of national parliaments. The article therefore analyses to what extent we can find a visibility bias in the print media cover-
age of Eurosceptic parliamentary actors and explores the factors that contribute to such bias. For the analysis, it draws on
a quantitative dataset of all newspaper articles covering parliamentary EU affairs in six member states (Austria, Finland,
France, Germany, Poland and the UK) over a period of four years (2010 to 2013).
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1. Introduction
The 2016 referendum in the UK on leaving the EU and its
aftermath not only sent shock waves through the Union,
it has also brought home two very uncomfortable truths.
First, it made, again, powerfully clear how deep the rejec-
tion of, but also the disconnect between, at least parts of
the citizens of the EU and the Union is and, second, how
little many citizens actually know about the EU.
Both insights are not exactly new, and have been dis-
cussed for some time now under the broad umbrella
of the EU’s infamous democratic deficit. Described as a
move away from the ‘permissive consensus’ (Lindbergh
& Scheingold, 1970), that is the friendly ignorance of cit-
izens towards the EU, towards a more ‘constraining dis-
sensus’ (Hooghe &Marks, 2009) or even ‘destructive dis-
sent’ (Daddow, 2012), this development has, inter alia,
also led to a greater interest in the role of national parlia-
ments in EU affairs, and in their communication function
in particular (Auel, Eisele, & Kinski, 2016; Auel & Raunio,
2014; Rauh, 2015; Rauh & De Wilde, 2018; Wendler,
2016;Winzen, DeRuiter, &Rocabert, 2018). By communi-
cating EU affairs to their citizens, the argument goes, par-
liaments can not only legitimise national politics in EU af-
fairs, but also overcome the disconnect between citizens
and the EU:
The communicative performance of national parlia-
ments in EU affairs is directly related to the often
discussed democratic deficits of supranational gover-
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nance: if MPs raise European issues, they offer a rem-
edy to the otherwise opaque procedures, the over-
whelming complexity, and the difficult attribution of
political responsibility in decision-making beyond the
nation state. (Rauh, 2015, p. 118)
The ability of national parliaments to connect their cit-
izens to the EU and EU politics does, however, depend
crucially on whether they are actually able to reach a
wider audience. The internet has clearly facilitated parlia-
mentary communication via social media, websites, web
streams or parliamentary TV. Yet although we lack sys-
tematic data, it remains questionable whether citizens
actually make broad use of these opportunities. Here,
the mass media still play an important role as a relais be-
tween politics and the citizens. Traditional media, such
as newspapers and TV are certainly no longer ‘the only
contact many [citizens] have with politics’ (McCombs &
Shaw, 1972, p. 176), but surveys consistently show them
still to be among the important sources of information
about political issues (e.g., Reuters Institute, 2018).
In contrast to social media or websites, which es-
tablish an unfiltered, un’mediated’ line of communica-
tion between MPs and citizen, traditional media are not
simply an arena that can be strategically occupied by
political actors, but autonomous players that engage
‘in making European news’ (Trenz, Conrad, & Rosén,
2009, p. 343, emphasis added) and thus contribute to
the shaping of public discourse about the EU. Various
studies have linked the coverage of EU news in the
media to public perceptions of the EU (Schuck & De
Vreese, 2006; Vliegenthart, Schuck, Boomgaarden, &
De Vreese, 2008; for an excellent discussion see Galpin
& Trenz, 2017) as well as turnout and vote choice in
the European Parliament (EP) elections (Van Spanje &
De Vreese, 2014) or in EU-related domestic referendums
(Elenbaas & De Vreese, 2008). This raises not only the
question to what extent the media cover parliamentary
engagement in EU affairs more generally, but also who
within parliament gets the opportunity to raise European
issues in the media, to explain procedures and to at-
tribute responsibility.
With regard to the former, studies have shown that
parliaments generally tend to play a minor role in na-
tional EU news compared to domestic executives or EU
actors (De Wilde, 2014; Koopmans & Statham, 2010).
Still, Auel, Eisele and Kinski (2018) find that parlia-
ments are still routinely covered in the media and, more-
over, that the more active parliaments are in EU affairs,
the greater the attention they gain in the press. Yet
so far, we know little about the latter, namely about
the visibility of different parliamentary actors in the
media when it comes to the coverage of parliamen-
tary EU affairs. A number of studies have investigated
the media visibility of parliamentarians (see Vos, 2014,
for an overview), but with very few exceptions (e.g.,
Gattermann & Vasilopoulou, 2015), these studies focus
on domestic rather than EU politics.
In the context of this thematic issue, and especially
given the recent surge in public Euroscepticism through-
out the EU aswell as the successes of Eurosceptic parties,
the question of media visibility is of particular interest
with regard to Eurosceptic parliamentary party groups
(PPGs) and MPs. Research has shown that the relative
visibility of parties and candidates can also have a strong
impact on vote choice (Eberl, Boomgaarden, & Wagner,
2017; Takens, Kleinnijenhuis, van Hoof, & van Atteveldt,
2015). At least as important is the question who within
parliament gets to take public ownership of EU issues. Do
Eurosceptics in parliament get to dominate parliamen-
tary EU news in the media—or do the media freeze par-
liamentary Eurosceptics out of the coverage? Bothwould
indicate a bias in the media and seriously undermine the
capacity of national parliaments to fulfil their commu-
nication function, which depends crucially on whether
they succeed in making ‘the choices and political alter-
natives involved in European integration visible to the
wider public theymean to represent’ (Rauh, 2015, p. 117,
emphasis added).
Against this background, the article analyses the
print media coverage of Eurosceptic compared to non-
Eurosceptic parliamentary actors and explores the fac-
tors that contribute to a more or less balanced coverage.
Drawing on the concept ofmedia bias, the aim is tomake
a contribution at three levels: first, empirically, by provid-
ing the first investigation into the question of the relative
visibility of Eurosceptic parliamentary actors in the do-
mestic media coverage of parliamentary EU news, thus
contributing to the literature on parliamentary commu-
nication in EU affairs, but also the media’s role in shap-
ing public discourse on the EU; second,methodologically,
by developing two different types of visibility bias that
take the relevance of Eurosceptic parliamentary actors
in terms of their seat share and their level of activity in
EU politics into account; and third, conceptually, by treat-
ingmedia bias not as an independent but as a dependent
variable and exploring factors that might contribute to a
bias in the first place. The article is structured as follows:
the next section develops the two different types of visi-
bility bias and discusses potential factors contributing to
bias, distinguishing between partisan and structural bias
and drawing on the notion of ‘newsworthiness’. Section
three presents the data and operationalisation, followed
by the empirical analysis in section four. The final section
discusses the findings and concludes.
2. A Certain Kind of Flavour? Measuring and Explaining
Visibility Bias
Bias can be defined most basically as ‘any tendency in
a news report to deviate from an accurate, neutral, bal-
anced and impartial representation of “reality” of events
and social world’ (McQuail, 2010, p. 549). Related to me-
dia coverage more generally, bias means that a specific
actor or group of actors gets a consistently different cov-
erage than others according to a predefined of bench-
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mark for balance or neutrality (Hopmann, Van Alst, &
Legnante, 2012; see also Eberl et al., 2017). The prob-
lem is, of course, to define what should be taken as the
benchmark for a balanced coverage of political actors
or groups.
2.1. Measuring Media Bias
A first option is treating all (groups of) actors equally, i.e.,
providing them with the equal amount of coverage. This
is often the benchmark used in two-party systems and
especially for the news coverage of presidential elections
in the US (D’Alessio & Allen, 2000). For European multi-
party systems, however, equal shares of the news cov-
erage ignore the relative size and thus relevance of the
PPGs. Indeed, in many European countries the relative
amount of parties’ coverage during election campaign
is regulated for public broadcasting to achieve balanced
coverage through allocated shares (see Hopmann et al.,
2012, for examples). In line withmuch of the literature, a
firstmeasure of biaswill therefore be based on the defini-
tion of balanced coverage as a share of the coverage that
is equal to the relative size of the Eurosceptic group(s) in
parliament, and thus to their share of the seats.
Yetmeasuring bias solely in the basis of the seat share
ignores what groups actually do in parliament. It is en-
tirely possible, for example, for smaller groups to be very
active in parliament, especially in policy areas of impor-
tance to them. The secondmeasure of visibility bias there-
fore takes the activities within parliament into account.
This measures howmuch Eurosceptics are engaged in EU
affairs within parliament compared to non-Eurosceptics,
and thus their comparative news supply. In addition,
given that PPGs and MPs have to make a conscious
choice to invest scarce resources in EU affairs—rather
than in domestic affairs—it captures how salient EU af-
fairs are for Eurosceptics in parliament compared to non-
Eurosceptics. Visibility bias here is thus defined as a share
of the coverage that does not reflect the Eurosceptic par-
liamentarians’ share of activities in EU affairs.
2.2. Explaining Media Bias
To explore factors that may explain bias in the news cov-
erage, I draw on the distinction between partisan and
structural bias (McQuail, 2010; Van Dalen, 2012): parti-
san bias is the result of journalistic decisions driven by
an ideological rationale leading to systematically greater
attention to parties on a specific side of the political spec-
trum. Historically the press in Europe was indeed rather
closely linked to specific political parties (Hopmann et al.,
2012; Seymour-Ure, 1974). Reporting in a politically un-
biased manner has become much more of a journalistic
norm since, yet newspapers still feature editorials and
opinion pieces that more or less explicitly promote cer-
tain political views, actors, candidates or parties, while
criticising others (Takens, Ruigrok, & van Hoof, 2010).
Moore and Ramsay (2017), for example, have found the
media coverage of the UK referendum campaign to be
highly partisan. Studies have generally shown that par-
tisan views expressed in editorials tend to seep into
the general news coverage (Brandenburg, 2006; Kahn &
Kenney, 2002). Thus, partisan bias, or at least biases to-
wards a specific political position, can still be expected to
be present in the media (Hopmann et al., 2012). A first
expectation is therefore:
H1: The relative visibility of Eurosceptic PPG and MPs
is positively affected by amatching editorial line of the
newspapers.
Structural bias, in turn, is the result of journalistic rou-
tines and the judgement and selection of events for cov-
erage based on their newsworthiness (Van Dalen, 2012,
p. 34). Since the seminal study of Galtung and Ruge
(1965), news value research focuses on the criteria that
guide journalistic judgments regarding the selection of
specific events or actors for coverage. ‘This news judg-
ment is the ability to evaluate stories based on agreed-
on news values, which provide yardsticks of newswor-
thiness and constitute an audience-oriented routine’
(Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 106). Here, studies have
shown that some news values are rather consistently ap-
plied to political events across a range of news organi-
zations: in general, events that involve powerful actors
or institutions (power/influence), have an entertaining or
dramatic (negativism/conflict) element, or are perceived
as relevant to a significantly large audience (relevance),
are more likely to be selected than those not featur-
ing one of these factors (for a comprehensive overview
see O’Neill & Harcup, 2009; also Brighton & Foy, 2007;
Eilders, 2006).
The basic guiding assumption for structural bias is
therefore that visibility bias is the result of newspapers
according Eurosceptic parliamentary actors greater or
lesser newsworthiness than non-Eurosceptics in EU af-
fairs. Here, I distinguish between two sets of news fac-
tors or values that potentially impactmedia bias: 1) news
values related directly to the object of coverage, i.e.,
Eurosceptic parliamentary actors; and 2) news values re-
lated to expectations of the addressees of the coverage,
i.e., the readership.
2.2.1. News Factors Related to Eurosceptic
Parliamentary Actors
First, I assume the position of Eurosceptics towards the
EU to have an impact. Here, Taggart and Szczerbiak
(2002, p. 7) famously distinguish between ‘hard’ and
‘soft’ Euroscepticism. The former refers to principled op-
position to the EU that might be associated with de-
mands to leave the EU or halt further integration, the lat-
ter to a more qualified opposition to specific EU policies
or institutional choices, and Eurosceptic positions can be
located on a continuum between the two, an approach
also followed by the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES;
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e.g., Bakker et al., 2015; for a discussion of conceptual-
isations and measurements of party Euroscepticism see
Vasilopoulou, 2017). Given the importance of news val-
ues such as conflict and negativity, I expect:
H2: Eurosceptics with a more hard-line stance on the
EU have greater relative newsworthiness and thus rel-
ative visibility than those with more moderate views.
The underlying assumption is that journalists expect
readers to be engaged by political conflict, but bored by
political consensus (Vliegenthart, 2012).
Political conflict as a news value, however, also indi-
cates the importance of taking the position of the other
parliamentary actors and the overall level of conflict over
EU issues within parliament into account as well (Van der
Pas & Vliegenthart, 2016). As Auel et al. (2018) show,
for example, a greater conflict potential regarding EU is-
sueswithin the governing coalition has a clear positive ef-
fect on parliamentary news coverage. This suggests that
where the potential for conflict within parliament is over-
all higher regarding the EU, media attention for parlia-
mentary EU affairs will generally increase, thus reducing
the relative attention paid to Eurosceptics. Accordingly,
I expect:
H3: Eurosceptics have greater relative newsworthi-
ness and thus relative visibility, the lower the overall
level of conflict within parliament.
2.2.2. News Values Based on Readership Expectations
Second, newsworthiness as an audience-oriented con-
cept also depends on public opinion, and thus on the
relevance of EU affairs for the potential readership. In
line with the argument about the importance of nega-
tivity as a news factor, it can be assumed that stronger
public Euroscepticism is more likely to increase the rel-
ative newsworthiness and visibility of Eurosceptic par-
liamentary actors. ‘People naturally pay attention to
things that are [or that they perceive to be, the authors]
dangerous or threatening’ (Shoemaker, 2006, p. 107),
and Eurosceptics voicing such concerns can be expected
to have greater relative news value in member states,
where public opinion is more critical towards the EU.
In addition, it has be argued that what matters for me-
dia coverage of EU affairs is not so much the general
public attitude towards the EU (Brüggemann & Kleinen-
von Königslöw, 2009), but whether EU issues are actually
salient in public opinion, i.e., relevance as a news factor.
Where citizens do not really care about EU politics, jour-
nalists have little audience related incentive to focus on
EU coverage beyond mere routine reporting, in general,
and thus on the views or activities of Eurosceptic PPG or
MPs, in particular.
Yet the relationship between public opinion and me-
dia coverage is not a one-way street. As mentioned
above, and as the literature on media effects more gen-
erally shows (see Schuck, 2017, for an overview), the
media are not only ‘mirrors’, but also ‘shapers’ of pub-
lic opinion. Indeed, De Vreese (2007, p. 280) found
public Euroscepticism to be, ‘at least partially, a func-
tion of the diet of information that citizens consume
about European affairs’. Similarly, the extent to which
the media cover EU affairs may also have an impact on
how salient the public regards EU politics. Thus, assum-
ing a more reciprocal rather than straightforward one-
directional relationship, I expect:
H4: Parliamentary Eurosceptics’ relative visibility
is positively associated with the level of public
Euroscepticism.
H5: Parliamentary Eurosceptics’ relative visibility is
positively associated with the salience of EU issues in
public opinion.
3. Data and Research Design
The empirical analysis focuses on Austria, Finland,
France, Germany, Poland and the UK. These six member
states provide a representative subgroup in terms of size,
length of membership, geographical location as well as
public opinion on EU integration. Importantly, their par-
liaments differ in terms of the size of Eurosceptic PPGs,
the degree of their Euroscepticism, as well as their posi-
tion on the left–right political scale.
The basis for the analysis is a dataset including all
articles covering parliamentary involvement in EU af-
fairs in three newspapers per member state over four
years (2010 to 2013, N= 5589). For each member state,
the two largest quality broadsheets (one conservative,
one liberal) and the largest tabloid were selected (see
Table A1 and further information on the coding process
in the Appendix). Each article was coded according to
whether it mentioned Eurosceptic or non-Eurosceptic ac-
tors their own, together or not at all. The distinction
between Eurosceptic and non-Eurosceptic parliamentary
actors was made based on the CHES 2010 (Bakker et al.,
2015), and from 2012 onwards, the CHES 2014 (Polk
et al., 2017). PPGs, and accordingly their MPs, were con-
sidered as Eurosceptic if they had a score of 3.5 or be-
low1.Measuring Euroscepticism forMPs using party data
is, of course, somewhat fuzzy, as parties can be inter-
nally split. There is, however, no reliable comparative
data accessible on the position towards the EU for indi-
vidual MPs.
Figure 1 gives an overview over the distribution of ar-
ticles featuring either Eurosceptics or non-Eurosceptics
alone, together or not at all, across newspapers. As the
figure shows, in all newspapers we find a sizable share of
articles that focus on parliament as an institution and do
not mention PPGs or MPs at all. In turn, across almost all
newspapers the proportion of articles that feature both
1 The CHES scale ranges from 1 = ‘strongly opposed’ to 7 = ‘strongly in favour’ of European integration.
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Figure 1. Share of articles mentioning Eurosceptic and non-Eurosceptic parliamentary actors by newspaper (in percentage
points). Note: Due to the extremely small number of articles (N= 9), the Polish Superexpress is omitted from the following
analyses.
types of PPGs or MPs is astonishingly low. The Finnish
newspapers are the only ones where the share is over
20 per cent. France, Germany and the UK, in turn, are at
the very lower end of the scale. Thus, readers in the six
countries rarely seem to get both parliamentary sides of
the story within the same article.
3.1. Dependent Variables: Two Measures of
Visibility Bias
For the two measures of visibility bias, I selected all arti-
cles where either Eurosceptic or non-Eurosceptic actors
were mentioned on their own (N = 2.535), as articles
that mention both types of parliamentary actors auto-
matically display a weaker bias, although it may still ex-
ist. Mentions included direct or indirect quotes by par-
liamentary actors as well as references to parliamentary
activities by or positions of parliamentary actors within
an article. Given thatMPs can also have (had) other func-
tions, such as party chair (as opposed to chair of the
PPG) or member of the government, a strict rule was
applied: articles were only selected if the current role
of MP/the status as parliamentary party group was ex-
plicitly mentioned or clear from the context, current gov-
ernment members were excluded. I then calculated the
share of articles mentioning only Eurosceptic actors (in
per cent) out of all articles that mentioned either type
of actor on their own, aggregated at the monthly level.
Where newspapers featured no articles mentioning ei-
ther Eurosceptic or Europhiles on their own during a spe-
cific month, the bias was coded as 0 for both measures
for that month.
For the first measure of bias, the visibility bias based
on the seat share (fromhere on simply termed seat share
bias), I used the combined seat share of all Eurosceptic
party groups for each parliament (recalculated after elec-
tions) as the benchmark to determine the share of arti-
cles they ought to have received to guarantee balanced
coverage. I then subtracted their share of seats from
their share of articles for each month. If party A had 30.5
per cent of the seats, but was only mentioned in 25 per
cent of the articles in a given month, for example, the
resulting bias was −5.5 percentage points. The visibility
bias thus measures whether Eurosceptics receive more
or less coverage in any given month than would have
been balanced according to their size within parliament.
For the second visibility bias based on parliamen-
tary activity (from here on simply termed activity bias),
the analysis draws on the PACE parliamentary activity
dataset, which covers all parliamentary activities in EU
affairs within the six member states’ parliaments over
the same period (Auel et al., 2016). The share of activ-
ities by Eurosceptic actors was again calculated at the
monthly level by selecting all activities, where the iden-
tification of the PPG or MP is straightforward, i.e., oral
and written parliamentary questions as well as motions
and censure motions introduced in parliament. Clearly,
these four activities do not fully reflect the overall par-
liamentary work of MPs or PPGs. All other parliamentary
activities, however, such as debates, votes, hearings etc.,
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automatically involve both types of PPGs and MPs. The
measure also accounts only for the sheer volume, but not
the content of the activities, which may be more or less
relevant for journalists to report on. Yet parliamentary in-
volvement via questions ormotions on EU affairs reflects
at least to some extent the overall activity in EU affairs
and thus provides an imperfect, but workable proxy. To
calculate the bias, I subtracted their share of activities
from their share of articles for each month. Thus, the vis-
ibility bias measures whether Eurosceptics receive more
or less coverage (in percentage points) than would have
been ‘their due’ according to their level of activity in EU
affairs within parliament.
3.2. Independent Variables
3.2.1. Editorial Line
To measure the editorial line, two dummy variables
were included: the first distinguishes between clearly
Eurosceptic (= 1) and other newspapers. As the EU ed-
itorial line of a newspaper is often difficult to measure,
only those with a rather clear Eurosceptic stance were
coded as such. These include theKronenzeitung (Austria),
the BILD Zeitung (Germany), The Times and The Sun (UK),
but neither a Finnish, French or Polish newspaper (for
France, Germany, Spain and the UK, see the country re-
ports of WP3 in EuroPub, 2004; for the UK, see also
Daddow, 2012; for Poland see Filas & Płaneta, 2009). The
second dummy variable indicates whether the editorial
line and the position of the party match broadly with re-
gard to their position on the left–right scale (1 =match).
The basis are the CHES 2010 and, from January 2012 on-
wards, CHES 2014 mean scores for left–right party posi-
tion (scores range from0 to 10, left to right). Parties were
very broadly categorised into left (< 5) and right wing
(> 5) and then matched with the respective political ori-
entation of the newspapers.
3.2.2. Party Euroscepticism
Data draws on the CHES 2010 and, from January 2012 on-
wards, CHES 2014 mean scores for ‘EU position’ for the
Eurosceptic actors.
3.2.3. Conflict Potential over EU (Dispersion)
Drawing on Gattermann and Hefftler (2015, p. 314) par-
liamentary conflict potential is operationalised as the
parliamentary party system dispersion:
WPPSD =
√
􏾜
j=1
SSjk 􏿴Pjk − Pk􏿷
2
where SSjk denotes the seat share, Pjk the position of
party j in country k towards EU integration (using CHES
data), and Pk the weighted mean of all party positions in
country k.
3.2.4. Public Euroscepticism
Eurobarometer data on the percentage of citizens stat-
ing that they ‘tend not to trust the EU’ (European
Commission, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013). To test the robust-
ness of the measure, the percentage of citizens stating
that they ‘have a negative image of the EU’ was used as
an alternative, but the results remained the same.
3.2.5. Salience
To measure salience, I developed an index measuring
both stated and actual public interest in EU politics.
The index is based on the factor scores for the follow-
ing variables obtained in a principal component analy-
sis: share of respondents (European Commission, 2010,
2011, 2012, 2013) stating that they had an interest in
EU politics, share that had an opinion on their image
of the EU (both negative and positive answers), EP elec-
tion turnout 2009 and EP election trend in turnout 2009
to 2014.
Finally, I added a number of control variables:
3.3. Control Variables
3.3.1. European/National Event
The two variables indicate whether important European
or national events took place during individual months
(event = 1). European events include European Council
meetings and Eurozone summits, national events include
the parliamentary ratification of important EU Treaty
changes or EU related international agreements.
3.3.2. Election
Assuming that national parliamentary elections will im-
pact media coverage as well as parliamentary activities
generally, a dummy control variable was added, with a
value of 1 indicating elections taking place in that month.
A detailed overview over all dependent and indepen-
dent variables can be found in Table A2 in the Appendix.
4. Empirical Analysis
Figure 2 provides an overview over the means of both
types of visibility bias for the 17 newspapers. A first im-
mediate result is that the seat share bias is overall far
less pronounced than the activity bias. In addition, vari-
ation between newspapers and countries is also greater
regarding the activity bias. Second, there is also a pos-
itive bias in some other papers, especially the French
Le Monde, but the British papers The Times and The Sun
are the only ones with a strong positive bias across
both measures.
Turning to the factors impacting bias, I calculated
both types of bias at themonthly level by newspaper and
fit an ordinary least squares regression with standard er-
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Figure 2. Types of visibility bias by newspaper (means).
rors clustered by newspaper for each. Since the UK is
something of an outlier in the sample with the largest
Eurosceptic party, which was also in government over
most of the period under investigation, I also fit the re-
gression omitting the data for the UK newspapers. The
results are presented in Figure 3 (see also Table A3 in
the Appendix).
As Figure 3 shows, there are stable patterns across
all models, but omitting the UK data also leads to some
important differences. Interpreting the coefficients, how-
ever, is somewhat challenging as they only signal the di-
rection and strength of the impact of the variable. Thus,
it remains unclear whether a positive effect is, for exam-
ple, a decrease in the negative bias leading to more bal-
Figure 3. Regression results. Note: The figure provides the OLS regression coefficients with 95 per cent CI (for the coefplot
Stata package, see Jann, 2014).
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anced coverage, or an increase in the positive bias lead-
ing to greater overrepresentation. The following figures
therefore present the predicted values for the two types
of bias for all significant variables (all other covariates
held at their means) as the basis for the presentation of
the results. The analysis draws on the full dataset unless
stated otherwise.
Turning to measures of partisan bias first, Figure 4
shows the impact of the editorial stance of the news-
paper on the degree of bias. Here, the impact of a
Eurosceptic editorial line is positive and quite substantial,
although it mainly reduces a negative bias. When the UK
data is omitted, however, EU editorial line still has a pos-
itive effect, but it is no longer significant at the 95 per
cent level (p = 0.089) for bias based on seat share. Thus,
for seat share bias this result is driven to some extent
by the UK. The effect of a match regarding the left–right
position is positive as well, but not significant. There is
overall only some support for H1 on partisan bias.
Turning to measures of structural bias, I assumed
that more moderate Eurosceptics will generally have
less newsworthiness compared to non-Eurosceptics than
hard-line Eurosceptics and thus be less well represented
in themedia (H2). The effect is indeed significant for both
bias measures (Figure 5), with one additional percent-
age point increase in the position towards the EU (e.g.,
from 2 = opposed to 3 = somewhat opposed) resulting
in an increase in the negative seat share bias by about 5.5
percentage points and 7.5 percentage points for activity
share bias. Both effects become even slightly stronger if
the UK data is omitted, H2 is thus confirmed.
Yet although more hard-line Eurosceptics benefit
from greater relative visibility—i.e., less negative bias—
Eurosceptics overall do not benefit from a greater con-
flict potential regarding EU integration within parliament
(Figure 6). Indeed, conflict potential has a fairly strong
negative impact, both with and without the UK data. An
increase by 1 leads to a decrease of the seat share bias
by ca. 0.6 percentage points and of around 2 percent-
age points for the activity bias. Although these values
may seem small, the effect can be fairly sizeable given
the range of the conflict potential from around 6 to a lit-
tle over 19. Thus, the expectation that where the con-
flict potential within parliament is overall higher, the rel-
ative newsworthiness of Eurosceptics actually decreases,
is confirmed (H3).
To explore the relationship between the party posi-
tion and the overall conflict potential within parliament
further, I fit a regression including the interaction be-
tween the two (see Table A4 in the Appendix for the full
results). The marginal effect is negative in both cases,
but only significant for activity bias (Figure 7a) both with
and without the UK data. Thus, as the conflict potential
within parliament increases, newspapers pay relatively
Figure 4. Adjusted predictions for seat share bias and activity bias dependent on EU editorial line with 95% CI.
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Figure 5. Adjusted predictions for seat share bias and activity bias dependent on party Euroscepticism with 95% CI.
Figure 6. Adjusted predictions for seat share bias and activity bias dependent on conflict potential with 95% CI.
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Figure 7. (a) Marginal effects of party Euroscepticism on activity bias dependent on salience; (b) Adjusted predictions for
activity bias dependent on party Euroscepticism interacted with salience, both with 95% CI.
less attention to the parliamentary activities of more
moderate Eurosceptics. To illustrate the effect, Figure 7b
provides the predicted values for party Euroscepticism at
2 = opposed and 3 = somewhat opposed, showing that
the difference betweenmore hard-line andmoremoder-
ate Eurosceptics is rather substantial.
Turning to the impact of public opinion, the results
are surprising. Figure 8 confirms H4 on the positive rela-
tionship between public Euroscepticism and visibility in
the full sample, but the effect becomes not only insignif-
icant if the UK data is omitted, the coefficient for activity
bias actually becomes negative. Thus, the effect is to a
large extent driven by the UK, which is also the country
with the strongest public Euroscepticism in the sample.
The expectation regarding the salience of EUaffairs in
public opinion (H6), in turn, can not be confirmed, quite
the opposite is the case (Figure 9): salience has a signifi-
cant negative impact on both types of bias, and these re-
sults remain the same when omitting the UK data. Thus,
where the public regards EU affairs generally as more
salient, Eurosceptic parliamentary actors have less news
value compared to non-Eurosceptic actors.
I also included an interaction between public
Euroscepticism and salience, but the effect is not sig-
nificant in the full sample. It is, however, positive
and significant for activity bias if the UK data is omit-
ted (see Figure 10a, for the full regression results see
Table A4 in the Appendix). Figure 10b visualises the ef-
fect for public Euroscepticism at the minimum (32 per
cent) and the maximum (60 per cent) level in the sub-
sample. It shows that, outside of the UK, a low level
of public Euroscepticism has a more positive impact
where the public does not care very much about EU
issues. The more public salience increases, however,
the difference between low and high levels of public
Euroscepticism diminishes. Where salience is fairly high,
newspapers pay relatively more attention to the activ-
ities of Eurosceptics, or at least ignore them relatively
less, themore Euroscepticism resonates with the public.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
The article investigated potential visibility biases in the
print media regarding Eurosceptic parliamentary actors.
As the article shows, the benchmark used to calculate vis-
ibility bias matters. Overall the coverage in most news-
papers reflects the seat share of the groups much more
closely than the share of activity. In other words, rele-
vance and electoral support of Eurosceptic actors mat-
ter more for their relative media visibility than what
they actually do in parliament. Still, in some newspapers,
most notably the Austrian and Polish broadsheets aswell
as the German newspapers, the seat share bias is still
fairly negative, reaching between 8 and 11 per cent un-
derrepresentation on average. While the lack of a clear
Eurosceptic stance of any of the broadsheets in these
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Figure 8. Adjusted predictions for seat share bias and activity bias dependent on public Euroscepticism with 95% CI.
Figure 9. Adjusted predictions for seat share bias and activity bias dependent on salience with 95% CI.
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Figure 10. (a) Marginal effects of public Euroscepticism on activity bias dependent on salience; (b) adjusted predictions for
activity bias dependent on public Euroscepticism interacted with salience, both with 95% CI.
three countriesmay explain theirmore negative bias, the
same explanation does not hold for the Tabloids. Both
types of bias are indeed less negative in the Austrian
Neue Kronenzeitung, but the negative bias in theGerman
Bild Zeitung is rather close to the German average. Here,
at least, the question whether the ideological position of
the Tabloids on the left–right scale does (Kronenzeitung)
or does not (BILD) match that of the Eurosceptic PPG
does seem tomake a difference. The same is true for the
real outlier in the study, the UK. While both types of bias
are also negative in The Guardian, a consistent positive
bias regarding the Conservatives was found in The Times
and The Sun.
The results regarding structural bias show that hard-
line Eurosceptics are indeed relatively more visible in the
media (i.e., suffer less from negative bias) than more
moderate Eurosceptics. This suggests that news values
such as ‘conflict’ or ‘negativity’ do indeed also matter
with regard to bias and not just with regard to abso-
lute visibility. Due to the same news values, by con-
trast, Eurosceptics are relatively less visible in the me-
dia, the greater the overall conflict potential regarding
EU affairs within parliament. Although this affects mod-
erates more than hard-liners, Eurosceptics, and their ac-
tivities in particular, are less newsworthy where posi-
tions differ more strongly between the non-Eurosceptic
groups in parliament as well. This mirrors the findings
by Auel et al. (2018), namely that the conflict poten-
tial over EU politics within the governing coalition has a
strong positive effect on the general coverage of parlia-
mentary activities in EU affairs. To put it bluntly, where
European politics within parliament are overall consen-
sual and thus boring, Eurosceptics are more interesting
for the media. Where, in turn, the conflict potential is
overall higher, Eurosceptics are relatively less interesting
on their own.
Turning to audience related news factors, the results
for public opinion, in turn, were surprising. Stronger pub-
lic Euroscepticism is indeed positively associated with
relative visibility of Eurosceptic parliamentary actors,
but the result is driven by the UK data and does not
hold for the subset without the UK. This supports the
argument by Brüggemann and Kleinen-von Königslöw
(2009) that public attitudes towards Europe matter less
in terms of newsworthiness than the public salience of
EU issues, but in an unexpected way: the more salient
EU politics are for citizens, the lower the relative vis-
ibility of Eurosceptic parliamentary actors in the me-
dia. Thus, although Auel et al. (2018) have found public
salience to increase the coverage of parliamentary EU
news more generally, Eurosceptic actors do not seem
to benefit from that trend, at least not in relation to
non-Eurosceptic parliamentary actors. This emphasises
that if parliamentary EU politics have greater newswor-
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thiness in general, due to the overall conflict potential
within parliament (see above) and/or due to the pub-
lic salience of EU issues, the relative newsworthiness
of Eurosceptics decreases. Outside of the UK, salience
does, however, have an interesting effect when inter-
acted with public Euroscepticism. Overall, the activity
bias regarding Eurosceptics decreases the more the pub-
lic actually cares about EU issues, but the effect also
depends on the level of public contestation of the EU.
Eurosceptics are more visible (or at least less underrep-
resented) where salience and contestation go hand in
hand, i.e., where both are at a lower or at a higher level.
Before concluding, a number of limitations of the
study need to be addressed: First, given the overall re-
search interest related to the communication function of
national parliaments, the data only captures the relative
media visibility of domestic parliamentary Eurosceptic
actors. It therefore cannot provide a full picture of visibil-
ity bias regarding Eurosceptic actors in general. Clearly,
Eurosceptic parties such as UKIP, for example, are not
only rather visible in the media despite having no parlia-
mentary representation, but they also have a major im-
pact on public discourses on EU affairs.
Second, the impact of governing status could not be
tested in the present study given that only the British
Conservatives were in government during the period of
observation. As Vos (2014, p. 2249) shows in her meta
analysis of studies on politicians’ visibility in the news,
however, it is not governing status by itself that en-
hances news coverage, but ‘political standing’: ‘Cabinet
members, party leaders, and committee chairs have
a higher political standing and therefore receive addi-
tional coverage’ (Vos, 2014, p. 2448). Accordingly, the
bonus attached to governing status in terms of media
visibility mainly applies to politicians with a high po-
litical office, ‘and not to ordinary politicians, such as
members of parliament’ (Vos, 2014, p. 2448). Green-
Pedersen, Mortensen and Thesen (2017), for example,
find governing status to be decisive for media visibility,
but of the government actors appearing in the media,
79 per cent are either ‘the government’ in general or
ministers (Green-Pedersen et al., 2017, p. 137). Yet the
study here focuses exclusively onMPs, excluding Cabinet
members from the analysis. With regard to the visibil-
ity of PPGs, in turn, the division between Eurosceptics
and non-Eurosceptics does not neatly follow the govern-
ment/opposition distinction in the present sample: in
most of themember states in the study, a sizeable part of
the opposition consists of non-Eurosceptic PPGs, while
the governing British Conservatives, in turn, were in a
coalition with the most pro-European party in the UK,
the Liberal Democrats. The greater media visibility of the
Conservatives may therefore have had more to do with
the fact that the Conservatives had a number of intense
internal conflicts over EU affairs during the time—most
importantly over holding the referendum on the UK’s
membership in the EU and the related renegotiations of
the UK’s status in the EU—and thus only indirectly with
their governing status. Still, given that the effect could
not be tested, it can also not be ruled out.
Third, the time period under observation in this study
(2010 to 2013) covers the most turbulent period of the
eurozone crisis. This may not only have affected the cov-
erage of parliamentary activity in general (see Auel et al.,
2018), but also the relative visibility of Eurosceptic parlia-
mentary actors in the media, calling for caution regard-
ing generalisations beyond the observed period. As also
emphasised by Auel et al. (2018, p. 641), however, the
EU has hardly seen calmer times since 2013 due to the
refugee crisis or Brexit. It would therefore be interesting
to analysewhether the increasing politicisation of the EU
impacted not only the electoral fortunes, but also the rel-
ative media visibility of Eurosceptics.
To come back to the question posed at the outset of
the article, do newspapers support national parliaments
in their communication function by providing fairly bal-
anced coverage of different political perspectives on EU
issues represented in parliament? As the analysis has
shown, an answer is not easy as the assessment de-
pends very much on what a bias is measured against.
Overall, the coverage is more balanced when measured
against the relative size of the party groups, although
it is still negative in a number of newspapers. This is
both good and bad news. While the analysis shows that
Eurosceptics by no means generally dominate the me-
dia coverage of parliamentary EU affairs, few newspa-
pers provide a truly balanced coverage, especially when
using parliamentary activity as the benchmark. Thus,
which benchmark to use depends on the specific sub-
ject of the study, but it is, in the end, also a norma-
tive question. Should Eurosceptic and Non-Eurosceptic
actors be represented in themedia according to their rel-
ative strength within parliament (and thus their electoral
support), or should it matter what parliamentarians actu-
ally do in parliament?
What clearly seems problematic, however, is the fact
that newspapers devote a large share of the parliamen-
tary EU coverage (on average between ca. 25 per cent
in Germany and just over 50 per cent in Poland) to par-
liaments (or parliamentary bodies) as institutions in EU
affairs—and not the actors and groups working within
them. While such articles may provide citizens with in-
formation on the parliaments’ involvement in EU affairs,
they offer little in terms of the different political posi-
tions on specific EU issueswithin parliament. Indeed, the
share of articles mentioning both types of actors was sur-
prisingly low in all countries—reaching above 20 per cent
only in Finland. The media thus rarely present their read-
ers with both Eurosceptic and more Europhile political
views on EU issues simultaneously, which is precisely one
of the main advantages of parliamentary involvement in
EU affairs. Yet the possibly most important question re-
mains so far unanswered, namely how this media cover-
age affects public perception of, and trust in, parliamen-
tary representation in EU affairs—andwhether it does so
at all.
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Appendix
Table A1. Overview over newspapers.
Member state Conservative broadsheet Liberal broadsheet Tabloid
Austria Die Presse Der Standard Kronen Zeitung
Finland Aamulehti Helsingin Sanomat Iltasanomat
France Le Figaro Le Monde Le Parisien
Germany Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Süddeutsche Zeitung Bild Zeitung
Poland Rzeczpospolita Gazeta Wyborcza Super Express*
UK The Times The Guardian The Sun
Note: * The newspaper Superexpress was omitted from the analysis, as the extremely small number of articles featuring any type of
PPG or MP (N = 9) would have skewed the results.
Using both newspaper-owned online archives (of the print versions) as well as online data bases, articles were searched
based on several Boolean search strings combining EU- and parliament-related keywords and then selected manually by
mainly native speakers (2 coders per country).
Each coder was responsible for articles from all three newspapers in the relevant member state for 50 per cent of the
period of observation with alternating months. Coders received extensive training in two workshops and, where possible,
we conducted inter-coder reliability tests for the country teams to ensure both the unitising reliability (article selection)
and the coding reliability of our data (Krippendorff, 2004, pp. 214–216). Since the entire universe of articles on national
parliaments in EU affairs was coded, 2 per cent of the coded material entered the reliability test. For France and the
UK, the results met acceptable standards (Lombard, Snyder-Duch, & Bracken, 2002, p. 593): For the unitising reliability, a
Holsti of 0.85, and a correlation of 0.92 were achieved in both cases. The coding reliability was 1 for the formal variables
(country, newspaper, date of publication) in both cases and ranged from a Holsti of 0.85 to 0.94 (correlation 0.92 to 0.97)
for content variables. The reliability test for Germany, by contrast, revealed both unitising and coding problems. The coders
subsequently received intensive further training and feedback on their coding.
Inter-coder testswere not feasible for Austria and Finland (unexpectedly, one coder in each teamstartedmuch later and
had to be trained individually) and Poland (only one coder). For Austria, Finland and Poland—but also for Germany, after
the coders received additional training—‘test standard’ reliability tests against the principal investigator (both unitising
and coding reliability tests) were conducted for each of the coders individually. Results for unitising (Holsti ranged from
0.84 to 0.95, correlations from 0.92 to 0.97) and coding (Holsti ranged from 0.85 to 1, correlations from 0.91 to 1) met
acceptable standards. Additionally, the members of the project team repeatedly and extensively checked all data, and all
coders constantly received feedback.
Table A2. Overview over dependent and independent variables.
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Vis. Bias based on share of activities 816 −14.54 34.42 −100.00 100.00
Vis. Bias based on seat share 816 −1.93 21.49 −47.23 97.92
EU editorial line 816 0.24 0.42 0 1
Match nwsp/party l/r 816 0.65 0.48 0 1
Party Euroscepticism 816 2.45 0.59 1.60 3.38
Conflict potential over EU 816 13.06 4.46 5.99 19.35
Public Euroscepticism 816 54.81 8.84 32.00 72.00
Salience 816 1.23 0.75 0.01 2.49
EU event 816 0.52 0.5 0 1
National event 816 0.07 0.25 0 1
Election 816 0.02 0.14 0 1
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Table A3. Regression results.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bias seat share Bias activities Bias seat share, Bias activities,
UK omitted UK omitted
Editorial line EU = 1 8.679 14.33** 9.884***
(3.110) (4.107) (1.844) (2.001)
Match nwsp/party stance l/r = 1 3.205 3.589 1.493 3.567
(2.261) (3.352) (1.412) (2.459)
Party Euroscepticism −5.643** −7.723** −5.845*** −9.958***
(1.510) (2.366) (0.992) (1.791)
Conflict potential over EU public −0.576* −1.935*** −0.594*** −2.050***
(0.197) (0.334) (0.130) (0.251)
Euroscepticism 0.392** 0.512** 0.175 −0.248
(0.118) (0.145) (0.0915) (0.254)
Salience −4.766** −13.24*** −2.643** −7.250**
(1.261) (1.571) (0.831) (2.163)
Event at EU level = 1 −1.016 −4.812 0.699 −3.473
(2.056) (2.318) (2.126) (2.615)
Event at national level = 1 −1.137 −8.674** −2.034 −8.466**
(2.623) (2.645) (2.537) (2.585)
Election = 1 −5.060 12.92** −0.838 15.97***
(3.692) (3.899) (3.279) (3.704)
Constant 0.401 15.07 10.06 51.93**
(9.310) (11.82) (6.549) (14.40)
Observations 816 816 672 672
R2 0.137 0.207 0.067 0.140
Notes: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A4. Regression results with interactions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bias seat share Bias activities Bias seat share, Bias activities,
UK omitted UK omitted
Editorial line EU = 1 8.483* 14.17** 3.546 10.95***
(3.030) (3.786) (2.025) (2.418)
Match nwsp/party stance l/r = 1 3.295 3.721 1.452 3.599
(2.147) (3.067) (1.349) (2.069)
Party Euroscepticism 2.006 12.13 −0.748 7.119
(7.410) (8.541) (6.154) (5.598)
Conflict potential over EU 0.579 1.296 0.284 1.594
(1.243) (1.464) (1.151) (1.122)
Party Euroscepticism # conflict potential over EU −0.539 −1.520* −0.415 −1.771**
(0.611) (0.721) (0.540) (0.499)
Public Euroscepticism 0.439* 0.493 0.160 −0.920***
(0.184) (0.247) (0.196) (0.215)
Salience 1.211 −11.65 −4.768 −50.54***
(9.246) (14.98) (8.680) (4.299)
Public Euroscepticism # salience −0.132 −0.0890 0.0203 0.754***
(0.172) (0.275) (0.165) (0.0763)
Event at EU level = 1 −0.983 −4.750 0.711 −3.505
(2.071) (2.340) (2.140) (2.628)
Event at national level = 1 −1.069 −8.548** −2.048 −8.430**
(2.614) (2.648) (2.540) (2.650)
Election = 1 −4.371 14.50** −0.305 17.19***
(3.630) (3.958) (3.144) (3.345)
Constant −17.33 −22.47 1.432 56.41***
(14.98) (19.92) (13.95) (13.08)
Observations 816 816 672 672
R 2 0.139 0.210 0.068 0.148
Notes: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
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